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Executive Summary
Many nursing facilities in Ohio and nationally are increasingly reluctant, and sometimes
unwilling, to admit as residents individuals whose  legal  status  is  unclear.  This status may be
unclear because the individual is mentally incapable of consenting to admission and (as an
"unbefriended" person) lacks any  legally  authorized  surrogate  decision maker who can give
consent.  This  report, based on a literature review and on individual interviews with hospital
discharge planners, nursing facility admissions officials, advocates for older persons, and others,
examines this problem and its practical ramifications.
Major findings:
   • Many nursing facility admission directors are reluctant to accept new residents unless the
resident or a surrogate has clear legal authority to voluntarily consent to admission. This
reluctance is due to fear about potential legal (including regulatory) liability,  although
facilities with low bed censuses often are more flexible about accepting applicants who are
in legal "limbo."
   • Nursing facilities' reluctance to take certain applicants may cause excessively long hospital
stays  while  the  legal  details concerning decision-making authority are being resolved.
Delays  in  placement may expose prospective nursing facility residents to unnecessary
medical risks in the hospital and may financially penalize hospitals, which are reimbursed
according to a prospective payment system.
   • Hospital discharge planners deal with the problem in a variety of ways, such as paying
attorneys to initiate and carry out guardianships and working with public and volunteer
guardianship programs.
This  report  outlines  several possible policy interventions, both governmental and private,
for addressing jeopardized nursing facility care for decisionally incapacitated, unbefriended older
persons who require that level of care. These interventions include the following: 
   • Facilitation of appropriate guardianships by (among other things) enhancing legislative
funding of county indigent guardianship funds,  streamlining and economizing the
guardianship rocess, empowering adult  protective  services agencies to initiate
guardianships for individuals who are in a hospital or a nursing facility, instilling greater
uniformity among probate courts in dealing with these issues, encouraging greater use of
limited or partial guardianship, and  studying  the  feasibility and desirability of establishing
a public guardianship system that would cover the population addressed here and/or
enhancing the ability of volunteer guardianship programs to meet the need;
   • Recognition of a limited "good faith" exception to the usual informed consent requirements
in the case of "obviously" incapacitated  unbefriended  nursing facility applicants and
residents;
   • Consideration of developing and implementing an administrative system for addressing
consent issues as a less intrusive alternative to formal guardianship;
   • Encouraging the application of advance directives to this area; 
   • Sponsoring and/or supporting continuing education for professionals on these issues;
   • Using institutional ethics committees to help resolve difficult dilemmas regarding nursing
facility admission;
   • Supporting rigorous research in this sphere; and
   • Facilitating ongoing communication and collaboration among the key participants in the
nursing facility admissions process.
The proper public policy response to the challenge identified here will depend on  (1)  how
we define the essential character of the modern nursing facility and  (2)  whether we are guided by
a medical/therapeutic model, which emphasizes protection of the vulnerable and dependent from
physical harm, or by a legal/rights model, which emphasizes due process safeguards against
exploitation.
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Background
The Problem
In every jurisdiction in the United
States,  statutes permit the state to
involuntarily hospitalize in a public mental
health institution--or in a private institution
that has been licensed by the state for this
purpose--persons who are considered
dangerous to themselves or to others because
of mental illness.1  By contrast, every
admission of a new resident to a nursing
facility (whether  public,  proprietary, or
private not-for-profit) is voluntary, in theory.
Legal authority to involuntarily commit an
individual to a nursing facility does not exist.
That is,  the law presumes that every
admission to a nursing facility  (like every
other health care decision)  is based not only
on a physician's order but also on the
informed, competent,  and voluntary
agreement of either the new resident or a
legally authorized surrogate decision maker.
For instance, many nursing facility
admisions result directly from hospital
discharge planning processes. Federal
Medicare regulations pertaining to these
processes require that the hospital "must
discuss the results of the [patient's discharge
planning] evaluation with the patient or
individual acting on  his  or  her  behalf."2
Other routes to a nursing facility include the
hospital emergency department and the
individual's home, particularly when the
individual and/or family find, shortly after
hospital discharge, that they cannot cope
adequately with  the  demands of home care.
In each of these  situations,  voluntary
informed  consent  to nursing facility
admission is presumed as a matter of law.
In reality, however, many individuals
have been "voluntarily" admitted to nursing
facilities even though (1) the resident lacks
sufficient mental capacity to engage in a
rational decision-making process3 but has not
been formally judged incompetent by the
appropriate local court, and either (2) no
interested  family  members  are available at
the time of admission or (3) interested family
members are available but have not been
formally authorized to act as surrogate
decision makers through a guardianship/
conservatorship order or durable power of
attorney. In these situations, nursing facilities
ordinarily have accepted decisionally
incapacitated new residents despite the legal
ambiguity surrounding their admission. They
have suffered no negative legal consequences
for proceeding in this manner.
Widespread anecdotal reports,
however, primarily from hospital discharge
planners and geriatric care managers, suggest
that many nursing facility admission directors
are increasingly reluctant and sometimes
unwilling to  engage  routinely in these kinds
of admissions.  Current federal laws (mainly
the Nursing Home Quality Reform Act
included in the  Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act [OBRA] of 19874 and
implementing regulations,5 and the Patient
Self-Determination  Act  [PSDA] of 1990)6
and state laws, and the government surveyors
who enforce them, emphasize residents'
decision-making  autonomy in nursing
facilities,  exercised either directly or through
a surrogate.7  This emphasis creates
uneasiness, in facilities, about possible
regulatory sanctions and/or civil liability for
violating residents' autonomy. Many nursing
facility admission directors seem increasingly
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to balk at accepting new residents as
"voluntary" admissions unless either the
resident's present decisional capacity or the
putative surrogate's legal authority is clearly
established and documented. 
The greatest difficulty in nursing
facility or other long-term care placement
occurs in the case of mentally ill individuals
with significant behavioral problems and no
visible surrogates, because facilities are
concerned about their legal authority (if
necessary) to physically restrain and/or treat
such individuals with psychotropic drugs that
carry substantial risks. Nursing facilities are
prohibited by Title III of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA)8  and  the
Rehabilitation Act of 19739 from
discriminating  in  admissions on the basis of
an applicant's handicap. A facility, however,
can deny admission to persons exhibiting
dangerously aggressive behavior that the
facility is not equipped to handle and care for
properly.10
In addition, payment source still
frequently affects the likelihood of admission
to the  nursing  facility  of one's choice,
because some  discrimination against
Medicaid-eligible individuals persists despite
its illegality in most states. Nursing facilities
are subject to great pressure not to err in
admitting  individuals  who will pose
significant management problems, because
legally it is extremely difficult to transfer or
discharge a  resident  over  objection after he
or she has been admitted.11
In  light  of  nursing facilities'
reluctance to admit certain types of
individuals,   some   discharge   planners  and
care managers complain that transfers are
delayed or disrupted for numerous persons
who  should  be  transferred to nursing
facilities from hospitals  (which are not
allowed to abandon these persons) or from
unsafe home environments, until clarification
of the legal question: Who may voluntarily
consent o the nursing  facility admission?
Such delays often cause physical and
emotional harm to the eventual resident and
financial harm to the hospital; the resulting
"solution" is frequently to initiate and impose
a guardianship12 on the individual.
The  legal  and  ethical literature is
filled with discussions about individuals'
autonomy in regard to decisions about
treatment and daily living, once they have
entered a nursing facility. Thus far, however,
legal practitioners, lawmakers, and scholars
have virtually ignored the informed consent
status of the admissions themselves. For
example, the extensive  federal  regulations
and state statutes on residents' rights are
totally silent on admission status. The current
literature contains only a very few incidental
allusions to the issue and deals mainly with
thical rather than legal considerations.
Potential Constitutional Considerations
The status of nursing facility
admissions is complicated by the potential
impact of the  U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Zinermon v. Burch.13  In that case, the
Court ruled that the State of Florida could be
sued civilly for permitting an adult person
(who was later held to be mentally
incompetent) to  "voluntarily"  admit himself
to a public mental institution without first
ascertaining and documenting that thepatient
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Methods
had enough cognitive and emotional capacity
to decide autonomously about his admission.
Although the reasoning in Zi ermon
has not yet been applied to nursing facilities
either in any litigated cases or in the legal
literature, we must consider the potential for
such an application and its probable
consequences. Admission practices of public
facilities clearly implicate the "state action"
that is needed to trigger constitutional
protections for the resident. The extensive
regulatory and financing relationships (i.e.,
Medicare and Medicaid) between privately
owned nursing facilities and government also
may be sufficient to satisfy the "state action"
criterion.
The Admissions Issue in Larger Perspective
The legal status of nursing facility
admissions  in  the absence of a resident able
to make decisions or a legally authorized
surrogate  is  only  one part of a larger
situation concerning medical and other
decision making for incapable persons who
lack families or close friends.  The problem
also arises, for instance,  when a nursing
facility resident who is or becomes severely
cognitively and/or emotionally impaired (and
most nursing facility residents belong to this
category)  needs  specific interventions (such
as  restraints  or  particularly  risky and
invasive  medications  and  medical
procedures)  and  there  is no clearly
authorized surrogate willing and available to
act.
Similarly, nursing facility residents
often need to be transferred to acute care
hospitals  for  treatment of specific problems.
The hospital  (that  is,  the hospital's
physicians, who issue all admitting and
treatment orders) may refuse to accept a
person from the nursing facility and/or may
treat him or her in  the  absence of explicit
legal authority. In extreme cases cited by
nursing facility social service workers,
hospitals may refuse to dispose of a deceased
patient's body until the administrator of the
transferring  nursing  facility requests
(although  without any legal authority to do
so) that  the body be taken to a funeral home.
In addition,  hospital discharge
planners may not easily find health agencies
that will accept an unbefriended patient with
questionable decisional capacity, particularly
when the patient requests discharge to a
physically risky home setting. These types of
situations are  difficult  and need prompt
public policy attention. Their resolution,
however, is beyond the scope of this report,
which concentrates on nursing facility
admissions for incapacitated, unbefriended
persons.
Information Sources
To explore the legal, practice, and
public policy issues raised in the preceding
section, I conducted qualitative research from
late 1996 through early 1997.  In addition to
an extensive (but not highly productive)
review of the  relevant  literature,  primary
legal    sources,    and    selected     secondary
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Findings
materials, I held 30 structured interviews,
either in person or  by  telephone,  with
hospital discharge planners, nursing facility
admissions personnel, long-term care
ombudsmen, regulatory officials, nursing
facility trade association leaders in Ohio, and
representatives of national nursing facility
trade associations and consumer advocacy
organizations. In this report I present my
observations and reflections, based on these
sources of data and on less formal
conversations with  numerous other
individuals. The statements presented in
quotation marks are direct quotes from
interviewees.
Research Questions
I asked the following questions during
the structured interviews:
Are nursing  facility admission
directors reluctant to accept new residents
unless the resident or a surrogate has clear
legal authority to voluntarily consent to
admission?  If so,  to what extent and how
does this reluctance influence actual nursing
facility practices?
To the extent that a problem exists,
how do hospital discharge planners deal with
it? If there are delays in the transfer of
individuals from the hospital to a suitable
nursing  facility,  how do these delays affect
the various actors medically, financially, and
legally?
In practice, how are evaluations made
concerning the decision-making capacity of
individuals seeking admission to nursing
facilities? What process is followed and who
makes these decisions? What substantive
standards are used for this evaluation?
To the extent that legal uncertainty
about the voluntariness issue exacerbates risk
apprehension among nursing facilities and
hospitals,  and  this  apprehension is reflected
in changed practice, has there been a
significant impact on the number of
guardianships initiated and awarded solely or
primarily to authorize someone specific who
can legally voluntarily consent to nursing
facility  admission for decisionally
incapacitated persons? If so, who actually
initiates  and  pays  for these extra
guardianship proceedings, and who becomes
the guardian?  Is  the  result unnecessary
and/or premature guardianships, thus
counteracting the autonomy-enhancing intent
of current residents' rights laws? 
To the extent that nursing facilities'
legal apprehensions bring about socially
undesirable outcomes regarding the care and
placement of vulnerable individuals, what
educational, public policy, and other types of
interventions might be appropriate to address
this problem?
Legal Anxieties and Implications for Practice
Most of the participants from nursing
acilities  expressed anxiety about the legality
of  admitting  individuals  whose legal
decision-making     status     is     not    clearly
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delineated: that is, persons who are seriously
cognitively and/or emotionally impaired but
who have not been judged incompetent and
who have no willing,  available family
members or friends to act as surrogate
decision maker ("unbefriended" persons).
When  any  willing and available family
member (of any degree of relationship) or
friend can be located, facilities almost
invariably accept that person automatically as
surrogate decision maker for the resident.
They do not inquire into the source of that
person's formal authority, if any (and usually
there is none).  This practice is not enshrined
in written protocols but is followed almost
universally  by  long-term  care  professionals.
Lacking such a "warm body" with at
least sufficient decision-making capacity
(defined by one admissions officer as the
ability "to put an X on a piece of paper"),
contemporary nursing facilities are uneasy.
Their  anxieties  stem from uncertainty not
only about the legal validity of the admission
itself,  but  also about potential legal
difficulties in obtaining  payment  (including
the filing of Medicaid eligibility applications
corectly and on time),  handling other
financial matters,  and obtaining consent for
the initiation or discontinuation of specific
medical interventions for the resident in legal
limbo.  Such interventions include, for
example, transfers to acute facilities for
emergency treatment or removal of a
ventilator or artificial feeding tubes. Today's
surrogates may disappear from the picture
tomorrow as they die, become incapacitated
themselves, or decide that the needs of an
increasingly aging, demented resident exceed
their own abilities and tolerance for stress.
Some    nursing    facilities   still   use  blanket
written  consent-to-treatment  forms at the
ime of admission,  but such a practice makes
it even more  necessary to accurately
determine the resident's decisional capacity
and/or the surrogate's authority at that early
point.
Respondents reported that nursing
facilities formerly were willing to act
informally  in  the best interests of
i capacitated unbefriended individuals, but
now tend to  be  considerably more sensitive
to perceived liability considerations. Many
nursing facility administrators described
themselves as "paranoid" about decisional
capacity  and  informed consent for a variety
of reasons:  federal OBRA provisions
requiring that the resident's chart indicate the
designated person to contact regarding the
xercise of that person's  rights;  publicity
about the PSDA and advance directives in
general; anxieties that regulatory agency
surveyors will act inconsistently and
u predictably; and the omnipresent
exaggerated but sincere fear of the "daughter
from California" who will suddenly show up
and complain that "Dad shouldn't have been
allowed to  wander."  This  feeling  is
especially  intense  when  the potential
resident, even if not mentally capable of
making such decisions, actively objects to
institutional placement.
Most administrators and their staffs
understand intellectually that  regulatory
and/or  civil  liability  repercussions  in this
area are rare.  When they materialize,
however, these repercussions (or, equally
important, their threat) are disruptive and
consume time and resources. Several
interviewees     at    nursing    facilities   were
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initially cited by state surveyors for failing to
identify a specific surrogate in a resident's
chart, and were instructed "simplistically" to
"just find somebody for this  guy."  The
nursing  facilities  are  made  even more
uneasy, according to one ombudsman
interviewee, by the reaction of numerous
probate judges; they are not happy to be
bothered in the middle of the night with a
request for emergency authorization to do
something to, or for,  a resident who lacks
both decisional capacity and relatives.
Nursing facilities are most
apprehensive about admitting seriously
mentally ill or developmentally disabled
persons with violent, aggressive behavioral
problems--for example,  those  with a
psychosis uch as schizophrenia or a major
mental disorder other than dementia. First,
they are concerned about their ability to care
properly for such individuals in light of
available  staffing and physical plant
limitations. Also, they are worried about the
future possibility that they will need someone
to validly consent (over the resident's
objection, if necessary) to the use of physical
restraints, psychotropic medications, and/or
transfer to a more  secure  facility.  Finally,
they are concerned about the handling of
payment and other financial matters.
Nursing facilities that cater largely or
exclusively to dementia populations (those in
which control of behavior to limit danger is
most challenging) usually insist most strongly
on clear identification of a surrogate decision
maker before admitting a new resident.
According to several nursing facility
admissions officers interviewed for this
project,  this  position  is based at least in part
on experiences with hospital psychiatric units
that  "refuse to accept" resident transfers
unless a  surrogate has been named in a
durable power of attorney instrument or
through a guardianship order. In this area the
dmissions policies of many nursing facilities
and  hospitals  may  be legally questionable;
the PSDA prohibits requiring an advance
directive as a precondition to a patient/
resident's admission.14
Persons interviewed for this project
also stated that it  was  usually more difficult
to transfer incapacitated unbefriended
individuals  from  their own homes to a
nursing facility than from a hospital to a
nursing facility. Reasons include nursing
facilities' concerns about preadmission
screening and annual resident review
(PASARR) and about completing Medicaid
eligibility applications in timely fashion. In
some communities, physicians on the medical
staff of the local hospital sometimes ask the
ospital's ocial service personnel for help in
attending to those details on behalf of
community-dwelling patients who need
dmittance to a nursing facility. 
Financial Influences
The general legal skittishness among
nursing facilities seems to be translated into
admissions practice to varying degrees,
depending on how fully occupied a facility
happens to be on a given day--that is, how
competitive a facility needs to be in order to
fill its revenue-producing beds. Legal fears
often may be expressed as a pretext for
financial considerations. "Adaptability," said
one hospital social service director, "is a
function of present census." Adaptability also
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depends  on  the availability of someone who
is willing and able to sign an admissions
contract and/or Medicaid application that
guarantees payment  (and who can grant
access to the applicant's financial records so
that financial eligibility for this means-tested
program can be verified).  In  the  final
analysis, said the social service director,
"admissions are a  business  decision,"  and
"we are not mom-and-pops anymore." 
In Ohio in 1996, total nursing facility
occupancy stood at 91.8 percent; the exact
proportion varied widely across facilities.
Today, largely because of the success of
federal requirements for screening potential
residents for mental health and retardation
problems,15  state  home- and community-
based Medicaid waiver initiatives such as
Ohio's PASSPORT program,16 and
prospective  utilization  review  requirements
of private long-term care insurance policies,
more older people with difficulties in
performing activities of daily living (such as
bathing and dressing)  can  live  outside
nursing facilities.17 Few are admitted
unnecessarily or prematurely, at least directly
from the community. (Below, under
"Implications," I discuss the problem of
physicians and managed care case managers
who recommend an older person's placement
in a nursing facility too readily after
hospitalization.) 
In recent years, in addition to these
factors, certificate of need requirements have
been loosened and venture  capital  has
become more easily accessible, leading to
more building of nursing facilities, assisted
living units, and subacute  entities.  As  a
result, additional beds have been  created  and
the nursing facility industry has become
increasingly competitive. One of the primary
customers to be cultivated in such a
competitive environment is the hospital
discharge planner,  who  strongly influences
the flow of post-hospital  consumers and of
the dollars that follow them. Discharge
planners,  in turn,  have a symbiotic
relationship with nursing facility admissions
officers; these professionals need to work
constructively  with each other and thus have
a strong incentive to do so.
Facilities with a significant number of
beds to fill often manage to overcome their
misgivings  about  applicants'  legal status
much more readily than  those  which enjoy
the luxury of waiting lists. Facilities in the
former category tend to employ a much more
lenient working definition of decisional
capacity. They rely more readily on the
applicant's own signature during a "lucid"
moment than do their fully occupied
counterparts.  (They claim,  however,  that
they continue to worry and ask questions
about the legal ramifications of the residents
they have admitted in this condition.)
Thus, according to several of my
interviewees, the most dependent and most
vulnerable  individuals  sometimes are placed
as a last  resort  in  nursing facilities of the
most dubious quality, because such providers
are the most likely to temper their concerns
about an unbefriended  individual's legal
status--and their own  capacity to properly
care for that individual--in order to fill (and
pay for) their beds. These facilities are "most
willing not to stand on technicalities,"
according to one ombudsman, when the
i ividual has  already  been  certified  eligible
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for  Medicaid  or has another definite source
of financial coverage for services. The
"hungriest"  nursing  facilities  may even
initiate the  Medicaid  application process for
a new resident; other facilities insist that
hospital social service departments or
community case managers shoulder this
responsibility.
These "hungry" facilities are well
known to hospital discharge planners.
Although planners are frequently
uncomfortable with such  placements,  they
can take solace in the fact that ultimately
"every applicant gets in somewhere." For
especially undesirable unbefriended persons,
such as older individuals with alcohol-related
dementia  and  associated  behavioral
problems, specialized facilities in distant
locations may be needed for placement.
Conversely, many of the best local
facilities  can  afford to be more selective
about admissions. Therefore they act most
conservatively in restricting access to persons
with clearer legal status; that is, they do not
accept applicants  who  lack an available
family member or friend to act as present or
future surrogate. The most conservative
facilities,  usually those with the longest
waiting lists, even may (illegally) require a
third party to sign the admissions contract
even  if  the  applicant is not mentally
impaired, in a move to avoid future
management problems.
Several consumer advocates
interviewed  for  this project observed
cynically that when nursing facilities resist
admitting an individual without a specific
surrogate   decision   maker,    they    publicly
justify their conduct on grounds of residents'
rights and "company policy." They do not
claim to act from concern about their own
liability  risk  or  because they simply prefer
not to admit particular categories of persons
who are likely to  demand an inordinate
amount of work and  attention.  As one
nursing facility admissions director admitted,
it is "just easier" for the facility to deal with
situations when an identified surrogate is in
place:  "That way, we know the paperwork
will be done." 
This picture varies slightly in the case
of some comprehensive continuing care
retirement communities that offer multiple
l vels of care.  In  such  settings, when a
person  living  in  a community's independent
or assisted living section develops an acute
medical problem requiring hospital admission
followed by transfer to nursing facility-level
care,  that  community's  nursing facility may
be willing to accept the person  (who is
already known to the staff) despite a legally
uncertain status and a healthy institutional
census. Even in this situation, however, the
nursing  facility ordinarily attempts
immediately  to  formally  clarify legal
decision-making authority for that resident.
(See  the  discussion  of  guardianship below.)
Impact on the Parties
The practices described above exert a
tangible, direct effect on the various parties
involved. For the older individual who needs
timely placement in a nursing  facility, delays
of days or weeks--and,  in a few extreme
cases, months--have been reported, not as a
regular occurrence but  frequently enough to
be    notable.     During     these    delays,   the
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individual fails to receive appropriate nursing
facility care and is unnecessarily exposed to
potential infections and the other risks
attending a stay in a hospital. These unduly
extended hospitalizations ordinarily are
compensated very inadequately under
Medicare's prospective payment system of
diagnosis related groups (DRGs);18 therefore
the  financial repercussions for hospitals
(which vary widely in this regard) may be
serious.
Understandably, the hospital always
has strong financial, ethical, and clinical
incentives to expedite appropriate placement
of individuals. One hospital social service
director told me about the patient whose
unnecessarily extended stay in 1995 cost her
hospital over $100,000. No one had legal
authority to sell the property that made the
patient ineligible for Medicaid and therefore
unable to be placed in a nursing facility.
Numerous  versions of this story were
repeated in hospitals across Ohio. Most
hospitals today have a computer system that
tracks medically "avoidable patient days" as
well as the department  (such as social
services) that is responsible for those money-
losing days. In this way they can precisely
direct  the  pressure to move the patient out.
Financial considerations aside, other
factors also motivate hospitals (as well as
nursing facilities) to seek legally definitive
resolutions to dilemmas involving mentally
impaired, unbefriended persons. When the
individual's decisional capacity and/or the
safety of the treatment plan are in doubt,
hospital staff members are often tempted to
circumvent  he  moral dilemmas by "letting
the  judge  decide."  Defensive  medicine  also
may play a role. If a hospital fears potential
civil liability for injuries suffered by an
incapacitated but unadjudicated person whom
it improperly sends home to an unsafe
environment, it has a reason to seek
guardianship so that the individual can be
placed  in what is believed to be a more
secure, more protective nursing facility. 
Nursing  facilities must deal chiefly
with their apprehensiveness about potential
regulatory liability.  If  state  surveyors find
that  the provision of proper care for a
mentally incapacitated resident has been
hampered by the absence of a guardian or
other legally authorized decision maker, the
regulatory agency probably will require the
facility to move to establish guardianship. In
this way the facility can obtain informed
consent o the care that it has withheld until
this time.  Some consumer advocates gave
their own accounts (or those of volunteer
guardians or long-term care ombudsmen) of
residents  who had been denied elective
medical treatments that would have enhanced
their quality of  life  (such as corrective
cataract surgery  or hernia repair) because
there was no legally authorized surrogate
decision maker to consent to these
interventions. Surveyors are not considered
likely to exert  pressure toward guardianship
as long as the quality of care rendered to an
incapacitated resident seems acceptable. This
expectation, however, gives only small
comfort o most  nursing facilities, especially
in the absence of official, practical guidance
from government agencies.
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Current Strategies
In response to the financial, legal, and
other incentives cited above, most hospitals
have (often reluctantly) devised systems for
initiating  guardianships  for  mentally
impaired, unbefriended patients who lack a
legally authorized surrogate decision maker,
and whose placement in a nursing facility is
delayed as a result. Operating such a system
may be expensive for the hospital, but
generally it is extremely cost-effective. It
reduces the losses that the hospital otherwise
would incur as a result of such patients'
unnecessarily extended, prospectively priced
hospital stays. 
Various surrogate delineation systems
are currently used for incapacitated
unbefriended persons who need placement in
a nursing facility. These systems vary in
several important details, which address the
following questions:
   • W h o  a c t u a l l y  i n i t i a t e s  t h e
guardianship? Who acts as the
guardian?
   • Who pays for the processing of the
guardianship petition? Who pays for
the conduct of the guardianship itself?
   • What is the extent of the guardian's
authority?
In one common model, the hospital
files the guardianship petition  (often initially
on an emergency basis19 and later as an
indefinite order); provides and pays a
professional team consisting of a psychiatrist,
a psychologist,  and a social worker to
evaluate  the  individual's  decisional capacity,
submit its report to the court, and testify if
necessary;  and hires a private attorney to
serve as guardian. Usually the retained
attorney accepts authority over financial
matters while procuring and paying (on the
hospital's behalf) for appointment of a
nonprofit or proprietary social service agency
by the court as the person's  guardian. In
return for the efficiency achieved in
transferring the individual  to  a nursing
facility, the hospital bears the associated
expenses (unless the individual involved has
ufficient  assets  from  which the guardian
may be paid by court order). In addition, the
hospital is exposed to possible charges of at
least the appearance of conflict of interest.
In another  model,  hospitals--as well
as home health agencies, area agencies on
aging, case managers, and others concerned
with the  proper  placement of the
unbefriended individual--work with volunteer
guardianship programs to initiate and conduct
a judicially appointed surrogate decision-
making arrangement. Volunteer guardianship
programs have been  established by a variety
of charitable organizations (often with
religious  or  civic  affiliations);  these
programs upply someone who is willing and
able to be appointed as an incapacitated
person's urrogate decision maker when no
other suitable candidate is available.
In Ohio, volunteer guardianship
programs presently operate in (among other
places) Montgomery,20 Franklin,21 Richland,
and Cuyahoga Counties. These programs are
funded  from  a  variety of sources such as
local hospital associations (although this
arrangement  may create an apparent conflict
of  interest),  area  agencies  on  aging, county
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 indigent  guardianship funds,22 funds
generated by  litigation filing fees or interest
on attorneys' trust accounts, United Way
allocations, contributions by religious
congregations and civic groups, private
donations, and grants.
Several states have created public
guardianship systems through legislation. In
these  systems, government agencies, or
private agencies under contract or other
arrangement with the government at the state
or local level, are available for court
appointment as the decision-making agent of
last resort for the unbefriended in need of
formal surrogacy. In Maryland, for example,
the director of the state or local office on
aging may be appointed guardian in such
situations.
Many of these systems are limited and
specialized. In Ohio, for example, public
guardianship  is  available  only for children
and for decisionally incapacitated
developmentally disabled adults, but not for
adults who are severely cognitively and/or
emotionally impaired because of dementia,
depression, psychosis,  or any reason other
than developmental disability.
In the absence of one of the
arrangements outlined above, it may be
exceedingly difficult to obtain a guardianship
for a  mentally  impaired,  unbefriended elder
in need of nursing facility placement.
Attorneys are reluctant to agree to provide
their services without assurance that they will
be compensated reasonably. Private,
proprietary guardianship corporations make
themselves unavailable for appointment when
an  individual's  estate  lacks sufficient  assets
to pay their fees. Private individuals, such as
personal friends, clergy members, and fellow
congregants, may be intimidated--and thus
unwilling to accept guardianship--by the
perceived heavy responsibilities of making
difficult  personal  and financial decisions for
an  increasingly  demented,  often
impoverished  individual  over what could be
a long period. In addition, infrequent but
invariably well-publicized scandals about a
guardian's  misuse  of  funds or abuse of a
w rd always discourage recruitment of
guardians in the locality of the scandal. 
Accurate  national  figures on the
xtent and nature of contemporary
guardianship are difficult to obtain. Many
(t ough not all) of the professionals
interviewed  for  this  project agreed that
today, only a relatively small number of
inappropriate or premature guardianships are
imposed involuntarily on older persons. In
other words, the great majority of my
interviewees maintained that guardianship for
mentally  incapacitated unbefriended
individuals is sought only as a last resort.
Hospitals initiate a significant number
of guardianships, as a preliminary to nursing
facility placement, directly from emergency
departments. (Some of the larger hospitals
now assign full-time social workers for this
purpose.) In many of these cases the family
n eds the individual's Social Security
retirement23 check and therefore keeps caring
for  the  person  inadequately at home,
bringing her to the emergency department for
specific  problems,  taking  her home again,
and repeating the cycle until the hospital is
ethically compelled to intervene. Such
in ervention    is    most    likely    when    the
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emergency squad has brought the individual
into the hospital emergency department and
has given the social service department a
"social concerns" report on the individual's
poor living conditions.
A guardianship petition is usually
pursued because of a  specific,  immediate
need for a third party (such as a health care
provider and/or  financial  institution) to
legally clarify legitimate decision-making
authority. For example, a resident of a
dementia  unit  may  attempt to sign himself
out of a nursing facility;  as  a result, the
facility may be concerned about its own
possible legal exposure.
Otherwise, especially for indigent
persons who have no resources to support
surrogate decision-making services, decision
making for the incapacitated unbefriended
tends to be a  haphazard  affair.  Such
muddling through may be marked by reliance
on the emergency exception to informed
consent to eventually justify medical
intervention. Important decisions may be
postponed angerously, foregone altogether,
or (at the other extreme) made by default in
the form  of  maximum medical intervention.
In another scenario, health care and human
service providers often act either
independently  or in combination as
surrogates, but often covertly  and  hesitantly.
Issues of Decision-Making Capacity
All of these approaches to surrogate
decision  making  are based on the premise
that a particular individual needs a surrogate
because of personal incapacity.  Nursing
facility     admissions     personnel,    hospital
discharge planners, case managers, and even
consumer advocates make this determination
in  various ways before initiating a
guardianship etition or other surrogate
arrangement for an unbefriended nursing
facility candidate.  The procedure appears to
be totally unstructured and unstandardized; it
varies greatly across  nursing facilities and
even among staff  members in the same
facility, and  from  one  candidate for
admission to another.
This  picture  of capacity assessment
for  voluntary  admission,  which emerged
from my interviews, is consistent with the
situation described in a recent study. The
following passage is quoted from that study,
which examined the assessment of residents'
capacity to  discuss advance medical
directives:
[W]hen nursing home staff were
probed about how they determine
whether residents have the decision-
making capacity to discuss advance
directives and make end-of-life
treatment choices, no clear process or
procedure was described; rather a
variety of techniques were used to
determine  residents' capacity to
discuss advance directives...[T]here
was no ...explicit standard, and the
judgment is left to the admissions
staff...In no case was there a formal
policy and process of assessing
cognitive  ability or decisional
capacity. Instead, the process of
assessing residents' capacity...is non-
standard and often left to staff who
have  little  procedural guidance from
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Policy
Implications
either institutional policy or the legal
system.24
Adult Protective Services
Persons interviewed for this project
were ambivalent about the role of adult
protective services (APS)25 in nursing facility
admissions for  the  incapacitated
unbefriended. Many believe that the APS
agencies' potential helpfulness is severely
limited by a number of factors. First,
insufficient resources create an excessive
burden on caseworkers. Second, persons who
are already residents of nursing facilities are
beyond the jurisdiction of APS on the theory
that they are in a protective environment. (In
some counties,  however,  APS will continue
to pursue a guardianship for a hospitalized
unbefriended  individual  when the petition
was filed while the person was living in the
community.) Third, many APS agencies have
a widely shared reputation for not following
through on the submission and processing of
Medicaid eligibility applications for
unbefriended individuals whom they have
signed into nursing facilities.
Some  interviewees also accused
certain APS agencies of seeking guardianship
and institutional placement too readily,
without adequately exploring less restrictive
alternatives; yet it is difficult to generalize
when each county's APS system functions
independently.  In fact, many interviewees
cited as a major weakness the APS agencies'
lack of communication and of coordinated
policies and procedures.
In the next section I discuss public
policy  implications  of  guardianship  and  its
several permutations and alternatives, as well
as the process of evaluating decisional
capacity. I also outline private initiatives for
protecting  the  incapacitated unbefriended
who are nursing facility candidates, without
sacrificing their autonomy-based rights. 
Themes
The  key  public  policy challenge in
this arena is the need to achieve a balance
between  bureaucratic meddling,  which is
well-meaning but paternalistic and
counterproductive, and excessive and
unrealistic insistence on the hypothetical
autonomy rights of an extremely vulnerable
p pulation. Incapacitated unbefriended
individuals have neither true autonomy to
empower  them  nor true beneficence to
protect them; they live in constant danger of
falling between the cracks of our modern
social, ethical, and legal systems. At greatest
risk are those who are so seriously impaired
physically  and/or  mentally as to require care
in a nursing facility. 
How the policy challenge will be
addressed and how a balance will be sought
will depend largely on how we resolve two
philosophical questions with very practical
consequences: (1) What is the essential
character of the  modern nursing facility--
health provider,  mental health provider,
and/or homelike residence? (2) Should we be
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guided  mainly  by a medical/therapeutic
model, which emphasizes protection of the
vulnerable,  dependent  individual  against
harm and the maximization of that person's
physical and mental well-being, or by a
legal/rights model, which emphasizes
substantive and procedural due process
safeguards against exploitation and abuse?
Alternatives
With these  overarching themes in
mind, we may outline the principal
alternatives. Most prominently, government
might encourage and  facilitate the
appointment of guardians to act as official,
legally authorized decision-making surrogates
for incapacitated unbefriended candidates for
nursing facility admission.  This approach
could resolve clearly, in a timely (and even
possibly  proactive)  fashion,  the legal status
of those admissions,  as  well as the legal
status of the decisions made on the residents'
behalf at that time and later. 
Approximately 25,000 adult
guardianship cases are adjudicated in Ohio
each year.26 Ohio law,27 in keeping with the
least restrictive alternative  (LRA) principle
and the statutes of all other states,28 permits
courts to appoint guardians with limited or
partial powers tailored to the ward's actual
cognitive and/or emotional deficits. Even so,
courts create virtually all guardianships as
complete transfers of legal authority from the
ward to the guardian. In the same vein,
probate courts are empowered to appoint
temporary guardians in situations where the
ward may be expected to regain decisional
capacity.  They tend, however, not to favor
this    option    and    to   appoint   permanent
guardians instead. The ward then must
subsequently seek  termination of
guardianship.
 Most of the professionals interviewed
for this project suggested that the
overwhelming majority of current
guardianships are necessary both for the
welfare and protection of the nursing facility
applicant/resident and to safeguard the risk
management i erests of the facility and other
service providers. (They made this point
without detracting from the desirability of
more independent, more holistic geriatric
assessments of potential wards to inform the
probate courts.) Their key concern is the fate
of unbefriended nursing facility candidates
who ought to have guardians but are likely to
suffer  discrimination and mistreatment
because of the difficulties in obtaining this
needed source of protection. A typical
comment was made by one long-term care
ombudsman; her office will not accept
appointment as guardian for a nursing facility
resident  because  of conflicts of interest. In
the past few years, however, when a resident
truly has needed a surrogate and no better
alternatives xist, her office has moved from
automatic opposition to all guardianship
petitions toward facil itating the
accomplishment of guardianship orders
(including  identification of persons
appropriate to be appointed). 
A l t h o u g h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g
recommendations were not endorsed by all of
the interviewees,  and although some
xpressed considerable misgivings, the
substantial majority advocated government
actions that would encourage and facilitate
more guardianships in the following ways: 
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   • By legislatively increasing county
indigent guardianship funds.29 The
main  purpose would be to induce
more private attorneys and others to
serve as conscientious (not merely
formal) guardians for incapacitated
unbefriended persons--including
potential and actual nursing facility
residents--who  lack substantial
income and assets. The setting of
specific fees for paying appointed
attorneys from indigent guardianship
funds,  rather  than relying on
individual payment decisions by each
probate court, may be helpful in this
regard.
   • By streamlining and economizing the
guardianship process ("forgetting the
red tape"). The current expensive and
cumbersome process,  in  addition to
its other  shortcomings,  frightens
away many low-income families of
persons eligible for Medicaid, thus
making  those  persons unbefriended.
A more "user- friendly" guardianship
process might encourage more, and
more sustained,  family involvement.
In addition, many nursing facilities
complain that although  they will
accept an applicant once a
guardianship petition has  been filed
(on the almost always fulfilled
assumption  that  the petition
eventually will be granted), "the
process takes much too long."
   • By empowering APS agencies to
initiate selectively  (that  is, not in
order to "dump" a troublesome
individual) guardianships for persons
who are in a hospital or nursing
facility.
   • By instilling more uniformity among
probate courts in dealing with these
issues in place of the current
"independent, inconsistent fiefdoms"
prevailing in county probate courts.
(Examples include differences in
handling indigent guardianship funds
and court investigators' varying
degrees of receptivity to health care
providers' requests for assistance.)
This  uniformity  would include more
of a case management and oversight
role for the probate courts. (In late
1996, however, the Summit County
probate court called a meeting
expressly to advise health and human
services providers not to continue
calling the court investigator for help
in managing the daily problems of the
unbefriended.)
   • By encouraging the courts' greater use
of limited or partial guardianship.
(Currently a significant percentage of
all limited guardianships created in
Ohio are awarded to Advocacy and
Protective Services, Inc. [APSI] for
developmentally disabled wards.)
Interviewees also recommend
increasing the courts' use of
guardianship ad litem30 when, for
example, formal surrogacy is needed
only for a specific decision or for
several decisions grouped together
within a short period, such as acute
hospitalization during nursing facility
residency. 
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   • By recognizing a limited "good faith"
exception to the usual informed
consent requirements in the case of
"obviously"  incapacitated
unbefriended  nursing facility
applicants and residents.
In Ohio, public guardianship systems
have been legislatively created only for
children31 and developmentally disabled
adults.32 In 1971 the Ohio legislature
established  procedures  for nonprofit
corporate guardianship of citizens of any age
with  developmental  disabilities  severe
enough to  impair  decision-making capacity,
as well as  for unique trusteeship/
protectorship programs.33  The  Association
for Retarded Citizens was the driving force
behind this enabling legislation: Parents of
developmentally disabled children were
worried about what would happen to those
children after their own deaths. Presently the
state contracts to APSI34 the surrogacy
function created by this legislation.
Public policy makers, including the
Department of Aging, should study the
developmental disabilities model, as well as
public  guardianship  systems in other states,
to determine what elements (if any) might be
applicable to the situation of incapacitated
unbefriended  elders  in  need of nursing
facility admission. Special attention might be
given to the  trusteeship/protectorship status
as an intermediate step between total
guardianship and complete neglect. The
investigators in such a study, however, must
keep in mind that the actual extent and
effectiveness  of  public  guardianship
programs  probably depend more heavily on
the resources that a jurisdiction  appropriates
for its operation (which generally are grossly
insufficient) han on the terms of the enabling
legislation. In addition, any new system
establishing a contractual relationship with a
private  agency  to perform public
guardianship  functions  should avoid APSI-
like conflicts of interest.  It can do so by
trictly separating the guardianship agency
from direct supervision by its state funder,
thereby  maintaining  a  more appropriate
arms-length relationship.
If actions to encourage and facilitate
private,  volunteer,  and/or public
guardianships are successful, guardianship
petitions and orders will proliferate.
Consequently nursing facilities will be even
more reluctant to admit incapacitated
unbefriended applicants without an explicitly
authorized legal surrogacy arrangement. Is
such a state of affairs  desirable,  as opposed
to alternatives that might better promote the
welfare of the unbefriended without unduly
compromising their autonomy?  To answer
this policy question,  sponsored research
would be useful;  the data could tell us
whether the risk of abuse, neglect, or
exploitation  of  nursing facility residents is
tied in any way to the absence of formal
guardians (and, if so, how), or whether
residents  with  families  and friends are
equally likely to be mistreated or ignored. 
At least two states (New York and
California) have created an official but
nonjudicial alternative to guardianship for
unbefriended  persons  with  mental
disabilities.  The  California  statute35 cr ates
an administrative mechanism for approving
interventions in nursing facilities for
d cisionally  incapacitated  residents  with  no
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legally authorized surrogate; this statute has
been upheld against constitutional attack.36
Harvard  University  geriatrician
Muriel R. Gillick has proposed the
development and dissemination of a new in-
house surrogate system, which would use
relevant  nursing facility staff members to
make  decisions  for incapacitated
unbefriended residents.37 There is no
compelling reason why some version of this
system  could not be employed in making
initial decisions about admitting particular
applicants. In a similar situation, attorney
Bruce Winick has urged use of informal
administrative methods,  rather than
adversarial judicial proceedings, to determine
a person's capacity to voluntarily consent to
psychiatric  hospitalization.38  Gillick's
proposal isguided by the medical/therapeutic
model  mentioned  above,  which gives
primacy  to the ethical principle of
beneficence. 
Gillick's proposal, however, has been
criticized  by  a  leading national nursing
facility consumer advocate whose thinking is
based on the legal/rights  model.  This
advocate believes that this proposal is laden
with real  and apparent conflicts of interest,
and  prefers a high degree of role
differentiation for nursing facility staff
members.39  This criticism was not shared by
all of the long-term care ombudsmen I
interviewed: Those who serve rural areas
especially, where "everybody has known
everybody forever," thought it "made natural
sense" for staff members to act as surrogate
decision makers of last resort. 
Many existing volunteer guardianship
programs are commendable; even so, it is
probably  unrealistic  to expect this sector to
be developed and funded well enough to fill
the burgeoning need. By definition, these
programs have only minimal paid staff and
depend  heavily  on  individual volunteers'
ime, generosity, and reliability. These
elements  are  finite and largely unpredictable
in a population of persons who tend to be
older themselves. Individual volunteers come
and go for numerous reasons. While
participating in the program, they must be
continually educated, reeducated, and
supervised--no small task. The volunteer
guardians'  willingness  and  ability to "push
the system where necessary" has been
questioned as well. 
In Ohio,  to exacerbate this instability
of volunteer guardianship programs (other
than for children or developmentally disabled
adults), probate judges may appoint as
guardian only a real person, as ppo ed to an
agency.40 Thus, when an individual in a
volunteer guardianship program ceases
participating for any reason, the agency
ponsoring  the  program may need to return
to court to seek appointment of a new
individual volunteer as guardian. Many
(though not all) volunteer guardianship
programs  have  recommended empowering
the probate courts to appoint an agency as
guardian; in this way the comings and goings
of particular volunteers may be treated as an
internal, administrative agency matter rather
than necessitating additional time in court. 
Some of the interviewees criticized
current public guardianship programs for
policies rejecting involvement in the  cases  of
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unbefriended individuals with any financial
assets. In many cases, these disqualifying
assets  are  too modest to attract willing
private guardians;  as  a result,  the person
with some  but not many assets remains in
legal limbo.
In another possible public policy
approach, the concept of advance medical
planning would be aligned more closely with
the needs of incapacitated, unbefriended
prospective nursing facility residents. Much
attention has been given to the use of proxy
directives, especially durable powers of
attorney, as a less restrictive alternative to
guardianship.  Under  these  directives, an
adult who is currently capable of making
decisions can name in advance a proxy or
substitute to act as  decision  maker if he or
she becomes incapacitated.
The chief problem for the population
discussed here is that its members have no
willing, able persons to name as their future
decision-making agents in a durable power of
attorney document, or else that the persons
whom they named as agents while they were
still  capable  are  now unavailable or
unwilling. According to one legal
commentator, this difficulty could be
overcome if the state legislature authorized
currently capable adults to appoint nonprofit
(i.e., charitable) organizations as their
surrogate  decision  makers to assume
authority in case of the principal's future
decisional incapacity. These organizations
either could be social service providers or
could be set up specifically to act as a
surrogate decision maker of last resort. This
approach would prevent the time, expense,
administrative hassle,  and emotional  turmoil
of  a  formal  guardianship proceeding; it
would permit the affected individual to
maintain some personal autonomy; and it
would promote beneficent treatment of the
individual--for example, by providing a
protective but efficient means of securing
appropriate admissions to nursing facilities,
and treatment in those  facilities,  for those
who cannot speak on their own behalf.
Assesments of individuals' decisional
apacity before initiation of formal
guardianship roceedings are improvised,
unguided, and inconsistent. For this reason
some of the interviewees called for a greater
degree of legal and professional guidance for
capacity evaluators. Standardization of
capacity  evaluations  promises  more
objective, more reliable results, although
quantitative measurements cannot completely
take the place of clinical judgment.
Much of the nursing facilities'
hyperdefensive activity stems from anxiety
about possible regulatory liability and
sanctions; therefore many interviewees
suggested more concerted training and
information dissemination for state nursing
facility surveyors and other relevant
regulators.  Training would include
information about OBRA, the PSDA, state
residents' rights laws, surrogate decision
making, and the informed consent doctrine in
general. Such government-sponsored
continuing education would produce greater
consistency and predictability in enforcing
legal requirements; more honest and more
realistic proactive communication on these
points between regulators and nursing
facilities; and ultimately a climate of legal
comfort in which nursing facilities would  feel
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freer to develop and implement more creative
approaches  to  the  clinical and ethical needs




none of my interviewees mentioned the
potential  role of institutional ethics
committees  (IECs)  in helping nursing
facilities to handle difficult admissions
questions. This may be because involved
professionals conceptualize this subject as a
matter of pragmatic risk management rather
than as an area of serious ethical and policy
dilemmas.  Such  a  view is too narrow;
nursing facilities should be encouraged to
explore the possible contributions of IECs
regarding help with formulating institutional
policy, consultation on individual cases
(concurrent or retrospective),  and education
of the nursing facility staff and others,
including families.
Many interviewees called for more
communication and education among
hospitals, nursing facilities, and home care
agencies about their respective environments
and constraints. In 1996, to address what is
widely perceived as a lack of mutual
appreciation and understanding, at least one
Ohio  long-term care ombudsman established
a working group to deal with behavioral
problems in hospitals and nursing facilities,
including those pertaining to admission,
transfer, and discharge of residents. This
project was received enthusiastically.
Ombudsmen's offices also can provide an
invaluable  service  by  conducting   in-service
training  on  numerous topics related to
nursing facility admission. 
Almost all of the interviewees
proposed actions to educate physicians about
post-hospital care of the chronically disabled,
including incapacitated unbefriended patients.
As  discussed  earlier,  most discharge
planners, nursing facility admissions staff
members,  and consumer advocates believe
that programs to divert people from
unnecessary institutionalization have been
largely effective.  Yet these persons also
charge that many physicians are poorly
informed about  these  less restrictive long-
term care alternatives and about level-of-care
issues in general.  Consequently, they
complain,  physicians on the whole are not
very helpful in handling the problems
associated  with  nursing  facility admissions
for incapacitated unbefriended individuals;
more  formal  training in this area is
imperative.
Similarly,  many  interviewees
observed that managed-care case managers
often have limited backgrounds in long-term
care; thus they tend to equate the entire area
with nursing facilities. This increasingly
powerful profession needs more education
about  the  range of long-term care settings
and opportunities. 
Interviewees also endorsed more
education for other service providers,
particularly  nursing  facility  administrators
and staffs. Long-term care ombudsmen and
other  resident advocates said that providers
do not know enough of the relevant law.
Often,  as  a result,  residents'  wishes
regarding  treatment  are  ignored  ("We're  in
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doubt, so we'd better provide the full-court
press"),  advance directives are
overinterpreted, or other apparent refusals of
treatment serve as an excuse to abandon
troublesome residents rather than
personalizing their care.
All of the interviewees deplored the
lack of consistency and predictability in
practice and policy. They recommended the
creation of a process through which the
persons most concerned with the problems
raised by nursing facility care for this
population could discuss from their multiple
perspectives theissues outlined in this report.
The  goal  would be to formulate and
ultimately disseminate a set of broadly
acceptable policies and procedures. In this
way,  a  solid core of common expectations
and uniform national approaches relating to
the welfare and rights of this especially
vulnerable and expanding group could be
generated and promoted t  service providers,
regulators, and consumer advocates. This
collaborative, consensus-building process
could  be  supported by both public and
private sources (such as foundations).
The population of unbefriended,
severely  and chronically mentally
incapacitated older individuals in need of
nursing facility-level care will continue to
grow.  As  a  result of increased life
expectancy  and  other demographic trends,
the elderly will constitute an increasing  share
of the American population. By 2030, about
one-fifth of our population will be at least 65
years old, compared with barely 13 percent
today and less than 10 percent in 1970. The
proportion of the population age 85 and older
is  expected  to rise from 1.4 percent in 1996
to 2 percent in 2010 and to almost 5 percent
by 2050.
Some  members of this group will
never marry or have children, will have
children who themselves are geriatric when
nursing facility admission becomes pertinent
for the  parent,  will  have  children who live
far from them, or will outlive spouses and
children and will fail to execute advance
directives while still capable of making
decisions. In addition, many persons with
severe mental disorders, especially when
accompanied by serious behavioral problems,
begin  their  long-term care with family
support but eventually "wear out" the
patience--and hence the involvement--of
relatives and friends, who abandon them. In
fact, the absence of a satisfactory informal
support  system  in the home is one of the
most important risk factors in the need for
nursing facility admission.
Timely advance instruction and/or
proxy directives may alleviate some of the
current decision-making problems. Yet no
matter how much public and professional
attention is given to this topic, only a small
proportion of persons will take advantage of
this opportunity. 
A significant percentage of future
nursing facility residents will be admitted for
short-term  rehabilitative  or subacute stays
(for  example,  following  surgery).  Many of
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these  persons  will  be capable of making all
or most of their own decisions about medical
and financial issues: if not at the time of
admission, then shortly  thereafter.  Many
other residents, however, probably will be
severely cognitively and/or emotionally
impaired; as we increase our ability to keep
people  from  permanent institutional
placement as long as possible, those who
eventually are admitted for the remainder of
their lives will have much more severe acuity
than did nursing facility residents in the past.
As residents live longer and suffer more
chronic illnesses, more decisions requiring
appropriate  decision  makers  will be
necessary over extended periods. 
Initial decisions about nursing facility
placement will need to be made and
implemented within increasingly shortened
periods, as cost containment pressures
continue to contract the process of discharge
planning into a "whirlwind."  We cannot
ignore the imperative for public and
institutional policies, procedures, and
educational strategies that are both definitive
and creative and that take into account the
pertinent clinical, legal, ethical, and financial
considerations.
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